Abstract We consider conditionals of the form A ) B where A depends on the future and B on the present and past. We examine models for such conditional arising in Talmudic legal cases. We call such conditionals contrary to time conditionals.
try and model in logic the intuitive way of thinking in the case studies we find in the Talmud and try and export our findings to the modern logic, AI and law community.
Having some possible logics in mind (arising from our Talmudic modelling) we begin our exposition in this section by motivating them with a variety of modern as well as Talmudic examples. We then continue in Sect. 2 with a short focussed introduction to temporal logic and show what temporal patterns are charateristic to the Talmud. In Sect. 3 we give some pure Talmudic examples. If the modern point of view is different from the Talmudic one, we highlight and discuss the differences. Section 3 also explains through examples our new backward causality temporal logic and Sect. 4 presents the logic formally.
In Sect. 5 we offer a general discussion and compare our logical system with the important work of Guido Governatori and Antonino Rotolo on Changing Legal Systems: Abrogation and Annulment. We conclude in Sect. 6.
Let us begin. For general theory of temporal logic see Gabbay (1987) , Gabbay et al. (1994 Gabbay et al. ( , 2000 There are four types of CTT conditionals in Talmudic logic. The pattern is General pattern u at time t on the condition that w at time t ? s.
Pattern 1
Objectively w at t has a truth value, except that we do not know it yet. We will know the value at t ? s. See Example 1.
Pattern 2
Objectively w is an event, which may happen or may not happen, at t ? s. See Example 3.
Pattern 3
Objectively, w is a future non-deterministic event of choice. See Example 4. Pattern 4. Backward causality w at t ? s is actually the backwards temporal (legal) cause for u at t. This is characteristic to the Talmud and does not exist in modern legal systems. See Examples 5 and 6.
Example 1 (Pattern 1: Sale of a company). Consider the following scenario for the sale of a company: Smith sells his business to Jones on 1 January 2010. The exact amount for the sale (say x) will be determined by the company's performance during 2009. So x is defined to have value on 1 January 2010 according to the profits and growth as announced and calculated on 31 December 2010 for the period 1 January-31 December 2009. Say if growth and profits exceed 10 %, the price is x = k pounds, otherwise x = 0.8k pounds. Such conditions are common in business. It is also common that accountants take their time in evaluating company performance, as tax returns are done a year backwards. Note that on January 2010 all the information existed about the company's 2009 performance, except that we did not know it at the time.
We have to be careful here to distinguish whether the agreement is that the purchase price is 0.8k and an additional 0.2k is paid if performance exceeds 10 % or whether the performance determines the purchase price. The difference may matter for the purpose of taxation.
Smith and Jones agree that if growth is less than 1 % then the sale is off, i.e. the question of whether on 1 January 2010 the company is sold or not depends on future information we get about the 2009 performance. If the performance is low, then there is no sale.
Remark 2 (Discussion of Example 1). We need to address the following in view of Example 1 1. Adequate logical language to describe such phenomena, and all relevant distinctions. We call this area Contrary to Time (CTT) conditionals. 2. Identify exactly our intuitions and options for evaluating such cases.
3. See what extensions to the language in (1) are needed to model legal rulings for such cases.
There are definitely legal points which need to be clarified for this case; for example, we may ask who owns and runs the company during the year 2010? Suppose we agree that Smith continues to run the company. Suppose Mr Smith is negligent in running the company during 2010 and as a result of his mismanagement the company incurs serious losses. Can Mr Jones ask for compensation? The loss of a good company he bought? Smith can claim that there was no sale! However, had the company been sold outright on 1 January 2010 and Mr Smith was just acting as interim director, then certainly he would have been found negligent and been asked to pay compensation! Let us compare the above sale example with a different example.
Example 3 (Pattern 2: The Princess's Marriage). The King of a certain kingdom has a beautiful daughter ready to be married. To find her a husband, her father made a call to all young princes from other kingdoms to come and compete for her hand in marriage. Many came. The King said that the bravest prince who wins the test shall marry her. The test is to overcome and kill the big monster known to reside in the mountains. Some princes said that perhaps they are not qualified in bravery for such a competition. They asked ''can other members of their family do the killing for them''? The King agreed that if a brother or father of the candidate does the job and slays the monster then the candidate wins.
The King was very careful in setting up this competition. He made each candidate give his daughter a ring and sign a copy of a proper set of marriage papers with the condition that the marriage becomes immediately valid if the candidate slays the monster in the future.
The candidates went to the mountains looking for the monster. Many perished in the mountains, and many were killed by the monster. Eventually one of them came back after many months with the head of the slain monster. This candidate (actually it was the brother of the candidate which qualified the candidate) now claimed the validity of the marriage and declared himself married to the princess from day 1! He was told that during all these months the princess fell ill and died! The prince said that he is now a widower, since the marriage was valid retrospectively, and that he inherits all the princess's estates.
There are questions to be clarified about this story.
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1. What is the status of the princess before the monster is slain? I.e. from the time she signed the marriage papers until the time someone killed the monster? 2. What is the status of the princess in the period if no one slays the monster? (All candidates perished.) 3. What is the status of the princess in the period if two princes cooperated and slay the monster? (The princes may have been in a position where they had to cooperate to survive an attack by the monster.) Who is married to the princess now? None? 4. If the princess died in the period, should not the deal be immediately cancelled?
Clearly we need a formal language to talk about such examples and represent what is involved.
Let us tentatively write a(x) = x is a prince qualified to compete for the princess. b(x, y) = y is a brother or father of x u(t, x, m) = x kills the monster at time t. Wðs; x; yÞ ¼ x marries y at time s.
Example 4 (Pattern 3: Insurance example). We now give a common day to day example of insurance. A car policy can be viewed as a temporal statement of the form:
P: car stolen ) we pay where by 'stolen' we mean any other damage as well.
The policy has validity of 12 months, say 1.1.2010-31.12.2010. Let us represent this by ½1:1:2010À31:12:2010 : P During January 2011, the policy needs to be renewed. The usual practice is that the policy can be renewed any time in January 2011 and the validity of the renewal policy would be from 1. 1.2011-31.12.2011 . So assume that the date of renewal (i.e. payment for the year 2011) is 20 January 2011. What is the situation of insurance coverage on 15 January 2011?
Assume the customer had no intention of renewing his policy. So he was not going to pay anything during January 2011. Then on 15 January 2011, the car was stolen. He needs to hurry and pay the premium by 31 January 2011 and his car will be insured on 15 January 2011. The insurance company cannot say that he paid because the car was stolen and otherwise he would not have paid. This is irrelevant.
So we see again we have three periods here, as in Fig. 1 .
Example 5 (Pattern 4).
1. A man gives his wife legal divorce papers at time t, on the condition w that she does not drink alcohol for 12 months (until t = s).
The condition is that if the wife does drink during the period, the divorce is annulled. This can be viewed as an instance of backward causality (man made by Talmudic law). The problem arises if the wife does not drink but she dies in six months. Is the divorce valid, or is it invalid? She certainly did not drink in the first six months and will certainly not drink afterwards (being quite dead). If the divorce is valid, she died free and her brother inherits. If it is not valid then she died married to her husband and he inherits. 2. Another modern example of this pattern is the following.
John lives in a flat right next to rock musician Terry and his singer wife. John is much bothered by the noise Terry makes every night playing his music. One November (time t), John gave Terry $1,000 cash to be Terry's at time t, on condition that Terry plays no music until after the New Year (time t ? s). Three days later (after t), Terry died. John wants his cash back. Terry's wife said, here dead husband certainly is not going to play music. The condition would certainly be fulfilled. The Talmud sees this as a backward causality case. There are three options:
(a) Since Terry is not available at time t ? s, the deal is off.
(b) The money becomes Terry's (or his heirs) at time t ? s only and not before. (c) Since we know for sure that Terry will not play music (him being dead) the money goes to Terry (or his heirs) already at the time of death. Example 6 (Pattern 4). This is a naughty example. John gives a divorce to his wife Mary at time t on the condition that she has sex with Terry at time t ? 1.
The question we ask is are we going to allow this type of condition? Is the condition inappropriate? Does Mary commit adultery if she has sex with Terry at time t ? 1?
One can say that if she does have sex at time t ? 1 with Terry, then the condition of the divorce is fulfilled, Mary is divorced from time t, and so at t ? 1 there is no adultery.
However, the Talmud takes the view that Mary should not have sex with Terry at time t ? 1. If she does do that then she committed adultery and also she is divorced from time t (having fulfilled the condition).
We ask ourselves, what kind of temporal model explains these (and other rulings)? We shall see that we need a new type of logic for backwards causality.
Example 7 (Divorce variations). The following examples illustrate possible logical connections between the original action and the condition it relies on 1. Physically possible but legally forbidden condition A man a signs divorce paper to his wife b on the conditions that she has sex with another man c. The ruling is that if she does have sex with c then the divorce is valid. Note that there is a fine point here. It is sinful to have sex with c while she is married to a and therefore she cannot fulfil the condition without initially sinning. Once she has sex with c then she is retrospectively divorced and therefore there is no sin. Compare with Example 11 below. (Origin and ruling in Jerusalem Talmud and Shulhan Aruch, Even Ha-ezer, 153-518.) 2. Legally impossible condition
In Gittin 84-1, there is a variation of the above example, where a gives divorce to his wife on the condition that she marries c (rather than the condition of having sex with c). In this case the ruling is that she can get married to c and the marriage is legal.
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The puzzling question arises that when she wants to marry c, the condition is not fulfilled yet and so she is still married to her husband a and so she cannot have a legally valid marriage to c. So how can she ever fulfill the condition? And why the ruling is that she can marry c?
The answer is that the condition itself, because of the above considerations, is not legally consistent and so she was originally divorced without (the legally inconsistent) condition. Thus if an action is taken with an inconsistent condition it is deemed that the action was taken without that condition , as opposed to ruling that no action is taken (because there is something wrong with the condition).
Logically looping condition
In Gittin 83-1 we have the example that a divorces his wife on the condition that she does not marry c. 1 In practice such condition is not allowed because it looks like legalised wife swapping.
As long as the woman does not marry c, her divorce from a is valid and she is divorced and can marry anyone she wants. If she marries c however, she violates the condition and therefore her divorce from a is not valid retrospectively, and so she is still married to a. But then, if this is the case, her marriage to c is not valid because she is still married to a! But if her marriage to c is not valid then she has not violated the condition of her divorce from a, and therefore she is indeed divorced and therefore her marriage to c is valid, etc., etc., and we are in a loop! 4. Condition that one of the partners dies
These are cases where a gives divorce to b on the condition that x dies, where x is one of {a, b}. Such circumstances arise when for example a is a soldier who might die in battle and would like to ensure that in the event of his death, his wife b is retrospectively free from the time he has left for the battle. This was the custom in Biblical times, as reported in Shabat 56-1 The case where the condition is the death of the wife is in Yoma 13-1. In both cases the ruling is that the divorce is valid There is also a lengthy detailed discussion of such cases in Gittin 72-1 and in Kidushin 60-1. In this discussion there is a need to clarify whether some specific ''conditions'' fall under the case of backwards causality conditional actions or cases of the use of the Iota operator.
Language for contrary to time with examples
This section begins in Sect. 2.1 with a survey of known results outlining our conceptual options in formulating an applied temporal logic. It is a focussed introduction directed at the needs of this paper. The reader already familiar with temporal logic might also benefit from reading this subsection, as we offer a general point of view. The reader will also appreciate better our new and novel temporal logic of Sect. 5, against the background of this section. There will be further discussion in Sect. 6. We then continue in Sect. 2.2 to present the temporal patterns which occur in the Talmud. We shall then continue in Sect. 3 and present and analyse some examples from the Talmud. All of this is in preparation for our presentation of a temporal logic for backward conditional to be given in Sects. 4 and 5.
Choice of language
There are in the literature two main options here: Our own new TTL will emerge as a new third approach, capable of handling backwards causality in time. It is a completely new approach, but can be viewed as some sort of a variation of the executable family.
We now give more details on (1) and (2) above.
Traditional temporal logic
When deciding on how to model temporal phenomena, the first step is to decide on the flow of time. In most applications time is taken to be acyclic (non circular) with the past linear (no ambiguity or branching of the past) but with the future being branching to allow for the fact that the future is not determined. We start with a flow of time (T, \), T is the set of moments of time and \ is the earlier later relation. We have that (T, \) satisfies the following axioms.
1. \ is transitive and irreflexive. 2. For every t, the set T \t is linearly ordered by \ T \t ¼ fxjx tg: Figure 2 shows that (T, \) can be a tree, branching into the future with linear past.
Additional axioms on (T, \) are needed to ensure the tree property. For our purpose, we need not insist on trees.
There are two points of view we can adopt when considering the flow of time.
1. The external view, where we stand outside time and look at the entire history like God viewing the history beneath us. In this case there is no fundamental difference between future and past. There is only one actual real linear flow of time, the real history as it happened, and if we have a branching flow then the real history must be marked in the flow as what actually happened. See Fig. 2 . 2. The internal view, where we see ourselves as ordinary mortals residing at some point in history, and the future is truly branching, because it has not happened yet, and all we have is our linear past.
Once we decide on how we view history, we need a language to talk about it. Again we have two options:
OPTION 1: Use a global language to talk about time in absolute sense. This is like using a global clock dates and saying for example In the year 701 BC, Sennacherib king of Assyria attacked all the fortified cities of Judah and captured them OPTION 2: We use temporal markers relative to where we are (e.g. tomorrow, yesterday, when we got married) or markers of any kind. This is how the Bible does it:
Kings 18:13-15 In the fourteenth year of King Hezekiah's reign, Sennacherib king of Assyria attacked all the fortified cities of Judah and captured them. So Hezekiah king of Judah sent this message to the king of Assyria at Lachish: ''I have done wrong. Withdraw from me, and I will pay whatever you demand of me.'' The king of Assyria exacted from Hezekiah king of Judah three hundred talents of silver and thirty talents of gold. So Hezekiah gave him all the silver that was found in the temple of the LORD and in the treasuries of the royal palace.
OPTION 3: Use a mixed approach, as may be convenient for the application at hand.
We shall use Option 3.
We consider a two sorted predicate logic with atoms of the form Pðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ:
The first coordinate variable t is a time variable ranging over (T, \). The other variables x 1 , … , x n , range over a variable domain D t . We consider such P(t, x 1 , _ , x n ) as facts. We can quantify over t and x i , and write formulas like 8xuðt; xÞ for 8 tuðt; xÞ: It may be the case that some atomic predicates are independent of time. In this case we write a (x 1 , _ , x n ) without a time variable and understand that they are either true for all time or are false for all time. So if 8tPðt; xÞ _ 8t:Pðt; xÞ holds we can write it as P(x).
We allow for the Iota operator ðixÞuðxÞ and the ðitÞuðtÞ, meaning ''the unique x (or t) such that u(x) (or u(t)) holds.'' Iota can be used only when such a unique element can be proved or assumed to exist.
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Let the above language be called temporal L. It is a two sorted language. The atomic wffs of L are either Pðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ or t \ s.
L is closed under the classical connectives and the quantifiers Vt and Vx, and the Iota operator ðixÞuðxÞ.
A model for L is a flow of time (T, \) and a classical domain D t associated with each t 2 T.
We have an assignment h giving for each atom P a set of tuples ðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ where
For simplicity, let us assume that D t = D for all t. This assumption simplifies the model because we do not have to deal with uðt; xÞ, when x 6 2 D t . Of course, in real life, people are born and die and the domain changes. But also in real life we talk about dead people and yet unborn children and we refer to them and interact with ''them'' and do things with them and so we can allow for a predicate k (t, x), saying x is alive in time t. So x can be either live or a dead person or a person to be born.
Our basic statements have the form s : uðt 1 ; . . .; t k ; x i ; . . .; x k Þ: reading at time s uðt 1 ; . . .; t k ; x 1 ; . . .; x k Þis claimed to hold:
u a complex formula, e.g.
This gives rise to a two dimensional logic. Note that we use two indices for time. The t 1 , t 2 time indices are according to Option 1 and the s index which is the second dimension, is according to Option 2. 3 We can formulate a formal language for the Iota based on the temporal logic of the current paper enriched with the Iota symbol. We shall have to allow for ðixÞ/ðt; xÞ and for ðitÞ/ðt; xÞ to be formed independently of any semantical condition. This means that we have to give denotation to these expressions also in the case where there exists more than one element satisfying / and for the case where there exists no element satisfying /.
There are several options in the literature of what to assign to the Iota expression in such cases, but as far as we know, there is no discussion in the context of temporal logic. The classical options are to make the Iota expression undefined or to assign an arbitrary element to it. In temporal logic it is better to view the Iota elements as a non existent free element which may come into existence, should a unique element show up.
There is no need for us to pursue this course of action. It is too complex. Our paper (Abraham et al.) avoids the use of the Iota by using quantum superposition models.
Time s, the second dimension, is where we are (Option 2) and from time s, we are talking like gods (Option 1) about other times t i .
First note that we have to assume that for atomic sentences, all observers at s agree on the past. Thus to express this formally we need to make the assignment h depend on s. Thus h s (P) gives a set of tuples ðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ meaning According to s, Pðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ holds. Our condition becomes, for t B s
• ðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ 2 h s ðPÞ and s s 0 ) ðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ 2 h s 0 ðPÞ.
h s may not agree on future predictions. So if s \ s 0 \ t we may have ðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ 2 h s ðPÞ but ðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ 6 2 h s 0 ðPÞ:
Executable temporal logic
We explain the idea of executable temporal logic. Imagine that we are at time t and we consider the statement:
(*) If p was true at t -1 then q is true at t ? 1 with p, q atomic.
Ordinary temporal logic will have a flow of time and an assignment, giving truth values to p and q at each moment of time. Given such a model, we can check whether (*) holds in model or or not. The executable view is different. We imagine ourselves operationally living at a certain point in time, say time t. If we know the past (i.e. we have an assignment to the atoms for points s B t), but we do not know the future, as it has not happened yet. So we cannot check the truth of statement (*). What can we do?
We can make a note at time t to take action at time t ? 1 and make q true. This of course is provided that q is under our control.
The reader can see why such executable views are useful to us in handling backwards causality because it involves day to day actions making wffs true forwards or backwards.
Our conditionals are certainly most compatible with the executable point of view since the conditions involved are set in the future.
Sample uses of the language
We now give some examples of the use of time in the Talmud.
Example 8 (Sample contract). Consider:
s : x enters the room at t. Reading: At time s, it is said that the element x entered the room at time t. we distinguish two cases: Case 1 t 2 s. This is a statement about the present or the past. It has no prediction. Case 2 t [ s. This is a statement about the future.
We may use, at time s, the statement E(t, x, room) to identify a person at time s and say something about this person.
We can say s: the person x who (will enter) entered the room at time t, is now (at time s) in prison.
Using the Iota symbol, we write s : Pðs; ðixÞEðt; x; roomÞÞ To be able to say that and use the Iota symbol we need the condition that exactly one person entered the room at time t. If t [ s, we are identifying the person by what is going to happen to him. So at time s, s \ t we cannot yet be sure whom we are talking about. We can only be sure at time s \ t that exactly one person will enter the room at time t. We are saying at time s that whoever this person is, he is the one we are talking about.
Some people may take the view that identifying x by a future event at time t is not acceptable for some purposes (e.g. legal inheritance documents, etc). The Talmudic approach to such examples is addressed in detail in Abraham et al.
Example 9
Consider the following contract Wðs; a; yÞ, between individual a and individual y. Assume this document is put forward for legal approval at time s. The contract has the form s : Wðs; a; yÞ. It is a contract at time s between a and y. The content of the contract is spelled out by W. y is a variable for an individual to be identified as follows:
y 2 Y ¼ fyjaðs; a; yÞg:
a(s, a, y) is a predicate identifying a set of ys. If a is timeless and does not depend on s, then we write a(a, y).
Furthermore from among this set of ys we further identify those ys which stand in relation b to a specific z 0 . If this relationship depends on s we write b(s, z 0 , y) If this relationship is timeless we write b(z 0 , y). This z 0 is identified by future time t, i.e. z 0 ¼ ðizÞuðt; a; zÞ. Let us assume that both a and b are timeless. So we have altogether aða; yÞ^bððizÞuðt; a; z 0 ; yÞ:
It may be that a and b and u depend on other elements b 1 ; . . .; b k , with possibly b 1 = a.
In such a case we write a(s, b i , y) and we write b(s, b i , z, y), and also uðt; b i ; yÞ. The Talmud uses a; b; u; w in two main forms: 
Parameters of importance here are the following:
(a) does Y allow for more than one element? (b) Is t [ s or t B s? How is t defined? It may be defined or specified as s : c(t, x i ) in which case is there a unique t 0 known at s or only known at some later t, s \ t \ t 0 ? (c) Is a one of the b i ?
Here is an example:
Example 10 (Sample choice form: Breira). a says ''I will sell to one of my cousins either my Montblanc pen or my Parker pen''.
The pen I sell depends on the cousin and on a third party b. There are two cousins John and Mary. If I sell to cousin John, it will be the Parker pen. If I sell to cousin Mary then which pen I sell depends on party b. The dependence on b is whether b wins the election tomorrow. The cousin of choice for sale is the one who calls me first tomorrow to ask about the sale. Here a(a, y) is ''y is cousin to a'' (i.e. y = John or y = Mary).
''a sells Montblanc to z if b wins and z = Mary and a sells Parker to z if z is cousin John''.
Introducing temporal Talmudic logic (TTL)
In this section we discuss our advancing future-changing past model, capable of handling conditionals.
We begin with methodological remarks, on how we discovered Talmudic Temporal Logic. There are many examples and discussions in the Talmud about various cases of conditional actions and various legal rulings about them. This is our body of evidence. We were looking for a temporal model which can accommodate and explain all the different approaches and views of the Talmudic scholars discussing and ruling about all of these examples. What we call TTL is the simplest such model which can do the job.
What do we mean by a logical model? One's immediate reaction might be just to give syntax and semantics for the appropriate language and define logical consequence using the semantics. However, this is not sufficient for two reasons:
1. The Talmudic data by nature is a body of arguments, counter arguments and debates and so we would expect modelling using a proof theoretical and arugmentation system which can also model the way the debates are executed. 2. The nature of the temporal examples, as we shall see below, involves alternative histories which then disappear as time goes on, and so even if we give a many dimensional parallel histories semantic model, the natural way of defining a semantic consequence will be too weak to reflect what is really happening unless we are able to add to the language syntactical constructs explicitly talking about alternative histories. Such constructs, however, are not present in the Talmud.
In this section we introduce TTL using modern examples. The next section will present TTL as a formal logic and later we show how this model explains Talmudic examples. A very detailed discussion can be found in our companion book (Abraham et al. 2011a ).
We begin with some preliminary distinctions 1. Backward causation versus normative retroactivity Backward causation is when the effects can precede the causes, and normative and legal retroactivity is when we legislate backwards in time. There are similarities but the concepts are not the same. Conditional patterns 1-3 are more like normative retroactivity, while conditional pattern 4 is indeed man made backward causality. The temporal modelling of normative retroactivity can be handled in traditional two dimensional temporal logic, as Governatori and Rotolo have admirably shown since 2005. See (Governatori 2010) . We offer also a logical model of parallel worlds (Fisher). The backward causality pattern 4 does require specialised temporal modelling. Let us illustrate this distinction using item 2 of Example 5.
In November (time t), John Man creates social states (ownership, marriage, legal death, tax obligations, etc) by agreement and legislation. Some of these states (marriage for example) are done by the blessing and permission of God. Shkop believes that God also allowed for these states to be subjected to backwards causality (as God has perhaps done in Physics). Fisher does not believes that and accepts only parallel histories and normative retroactivity. By the way in modern law, retroactivity in legislation is not the same as retroactivity in contract law. This distinction is crucial in most modern legal systems. In the Talmud they are treated the same.
The role of presumptions in the legal domain
The referee suggested a slightly more complex example, where the lawmaker states at time t that some X should hold at t -x if condition Y occurs at time t ? y. Should X hold at any moment of time from t -1 to t ? y -1? Here we need more than one temporal dimension. [Note that this idea was already explored by Governatori and colleagues: see (Governatori 2010) ] If our temporal viewpoint is time t, and we model the situations as then we cannot derive (X holds at t -x) (from the perspective of real time t 0 , for any t 0 between t -x and t ? y -1. Things may be different in the law, since here legal presumptions apply. Consider nother example by the referee, a sales contract. If I sell now to you my house A on the condition that you will be selling your own house B in a month to anyone else, the law presumes that you are the owner of A, but this presumption can be rebutted (and the legal effect retroactively cancelled) if you do not meet the condition. This is an example of a conditional contract, which could be modelled, in traditional two dimensional temporal logic. Such distinctions are central in most modern legal systems. The Talmud does handle this type of consideration, and in a very fine tuned way. We have a companion book (Abraham et al. 2011a ), of over 600 pages, unfortunately in Hebrew, dealing with such issues, in chapters 26-28, pages 505-585. The current paper concentrates on modelling the main features of backward causality, which give rise to a novel temporal logic.
We now begin describing our logic in more detail. First we need to clarify some concepts. Consider the following statements.
1. The vase is broken into two pieces. 2. Mary is married. 3. John's income is from employment on a sea-faring ship. (Therefore is tax free!) Statement 1 is a physical statement. It is not a legal or social convention statement. One has a bit of leeway in understanding what ''two pieces''means and if one piece is very small we might say that the vase is ''chipped'', not broken. We might even argue, in the case of a slightly bigger piece, whether we can still say ''chipped'', or say ''broken''. The difference may be important for insurance purposes. Do we replace the vase or do we fix it? It may even be the case that the insurers stipulate that ''broken'' means, as far as they are concerned, broken into 3 pieces or more, but now we are into the legal domain.
Statement 2 is a statement of legal and social agreement. Society and the law allows for a marriage action a to take place, provided certain preconditions C a do hold and the result of which we get the truth of the legal predicate x is married to y. x is married is Ay (x is married to y).
Being a legal predicate, the marriage status can be changed by a divorce action b. Again, given preconditions C b we can make true the predicate x Divorce y. We have that if x Divorce y holds at time t, then :(x is married to y) holds at t. This is different from ''broken'' predicate. No action can '': break''. We can ''glue'' the pieces but what we get is ''broken but glued'' or ''broken (leg) but healed'', etc.
Statement 3 is also a legal statement. Here one can legally change the meaning of ''employment on a ship''. In fact the British definition included working on an oil rig. To increase taxation the government changed the meaning into ''moving ship'', thus excluding oil rigs.
Such a move can cause a lot of resentment because it involves backward taxation as Fig. 3 shows Contrary to time conditionals in Talmudic logic 161
The British tax system would claim that this is not backwards legislation as the tax assessment is done at t 2 ? 1. However, for the legislation not to be backwards one should adopt the meaning of ''ship'' as it was at [t 1 , t 2 ] for the purpose of tax paid at t 2 ? 1 on the period [t 1 , t 2 ].
We understand that countries like Austria, never legislate backwards. It is taboo! So the new definition of ''ship'' will be applied only to employment after t 2 !
Let us summarise what we need for our logic. We need to allow for time dependent predicates of legal and social nature generated by actions. We write them as follows:
• t Pðx 1 ; . . .; x n Þ if action a is taken by x 1 , _, x n at time t satisfying the preconditions C a .
• t :Pðx 1 ; . . .; x n Þ if either no action a was taken in the past or a cancelling action b was taken at t, with preconditions C b .
It is with this sort of predicates we want to present our logic TTL.
Example 11 Two security agents meet in a bar having a beer and discussing their profession. Say Microsoft chief security officer m and Google chief security officer g. m boasts to g that his methods are impregnable. g admits m is good but not perfect. m challenges g. He says:
I have a laptop in my office which is security protected. I shall clear the disk drive and leave it on the internet. At 18.00 hours it will be security protected and I shall call you and give you this laptop to be immediately yours on the condition that you break into it within 30 min.
m cautions g that he had better not trip any alarms because it is illegal to hack into the system. According to British law m, by making the offer to g is already giving him permission to hack into the laptop. We can change the example a bit. m sells the laptop to a. a makes the condition that if anyone hacks into it between 18.00 and 18.30 then the deal is off. Now m gives the laptop to g under the condition that g hacks into it between 18.00 and 18.30. Now g would commit a crime.
We have here three periods of time Think of it as that both m and g jumping instantly back from time t = 18.30 to t = 18.00 using a time machine and completing the deal. Their personal time is s. They live through history again and are back at t = 18.30 with their personal time s being 60 min.
5 Rabbi Shlomo Fisher, 1932-. 6 Rabbi Shimon Shkop, 1869 Shkop, -1939 At s = 30 there is a discontinuous jump from t = 18.30 back to t = 18.00.
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With s, we remember that crime was committed at s = 30. If m dies at 18.15 then he cannot go back at 18.30 (s = 30) to the beginning (t = 18.00, s = 30), to complete the deal.
Remark 12 (Semantic discussion of the Fisher approach). Let us appreciate the difficulties in modelling the Fisher approach. The Fisher view gives rise to a temporal history without memory. If you go with time to infinity then there is only one linear past without any memory that it could have been otherwise. It cannot be modelled by branching time with one infinite branch being the real history because it allows for memory of alternatives.
Example 13 (Iterated conditions). Once we allow conditional legal actions of the form a at t conditional on b at t ? s, we should be able to iterate. Figure 4 shows such a case.
The story is as follows: John gives Mary a pen to be her property immediately at time t on the condition that she buys some shares at time t ? s. At time t ? s Mary approaches Terry who has shares and he is willing to sell Mary his shares to be hers immediately on the condition that Mary does his garden on t ? s ? r.
The first comment we make is that we consider we have two actions here:
1. Action a starting at time x = t with condition at time x ? s. 2. Action b starting at time y = t ? s with condition at time y ? r.
According to Fisher we have two conditional actions which are chained by making basically y = x ? s. According to Shkop, we also have two actions which are chained by making y = x ? s. However according to Shkop the actions retain their identity as distinct actions in the sense that each action has its own s. So action a has s and action b has s 0 . According to Fisher, we have two parallel histories. See Figs. 5, 6. We start with action a at t and s = 0. At t ? s we have s = s. We want to jump back using our time machine and be again at t but with s = s. We ask ourselves: where are the shares? Do we have them at time t ? s (with s = s)? Can we jump back? Is the matter of the shares decided at t ? s so that we can jump back and conclude the deal if Mary bought the shares or cancel it if Mary does not have the shares? The answer is that we don't know yet, it depends on action b. Well, we have the shares but on the condition of Mary doing the garden at t ? s ? r.
OK then. We cannot jump back with s at s = s, because we have to wait for action b to play itself out with its own s 0 . So action a does not jump back to t, action a has to wait for action b. So both action a and action b proceed together to time t ? s ? r.
So now s = s ? r and s 0 = r and both actions are sitting at time t ? s ? r. Action a is waiting for action b to jump with its s 0 back to time t ? r and decide the Once action a gets an answer from b it jumps back to time t, decides whether the pen belongs to Mary and proceeds back to time t ? s. At this time s = (s ? r) ? s. Now it is known whether the condition b holds so s jumps back to t and proceeds straight back to t ? s ? r. By this time s = (s ? r) ? (2s ? r) = 3s ? 2r.
Notice that in this case action a is equivalent to a new action a 0 comprised of the giving of pen at time t on the condition of buying shares at t ? s with a final decision time of doing the garden on t ? s ? r.
The following is the scenario for action a 0 . The s count starts with s = 0 at at t! See Fig. 7 . The situation clarifies and the deal is executed on time t ? s ? r with s = s ? r. At that time we go back to t to execute the deal and s = s ? r carries on through history again back to time t ? s where another jump back is done to time t and then we go straight to time t ? s ? r with s = (s ? r) ? (2s ? r) = 3s ? 2r. Analysis according to Fisher: We have two parallel histories beginning at t = 0 and ending at t = s. At t = s a decision is made as to which history is real. If b has indeed married c then assume s is the first time this is done. Jump back to t = 0 and s = s and cancel the divorce. Continue forward from this point (i.e. t = 0 and s = s) and reach any t = r and s = s ? r for any r. b can never marry anybody at s = s ? r since she is already married to a since s = s.
Example 15 (Two actions). Let us have two actions. One giving the laptop at t = 18.00 and the other giving the pen also at t = 18.00. What do we do? We need two s counts. One for the laptop, s 1 and one for the pen, s 2 . In fact, during a normal history with many actions and many chains, we have as many ss counting simulated time.
Remark 16 (Analysis of chains). We now want to analyse Example 13 and prepare ourselves for Example 18.
Let us start with action b of Example 13. This action starts at an abstract time y (which was instantiated as y = t ? s) trying to make the predicate P b = ''Mary owns shares'' true at y.
The truth value of the predicate was not clarified until time y ? r. At this time the final predicate Q b = ''Mary doing the garden'' was the one whose truth value clarified the status of the starting predicate P b .
Taken in the abstract, the relevant parameters of action b are as follows:
1. Starting time y 2. Predicate involved is P b 3. Stretch of the action, namely the duration until the predicate Q b is to be determined, is r (i.e. it goes from y to y ? r) 4. The final predicate which clarifies the state of the predicate Q 0 b = Q b , at the same time y ? r.
Contrary to time conditionals in Talmudic logic 167
Let us now do a similar analysis for action a.
1. Starting time is x 2. Predicate involved is P a , (''Pen belongs to Mary at time x'') 3. Stretch is s, with predicate Q a at time x ? s 4. The final predicate which clarifies the status of Q a is Q 0 a = Q a also at time x ? s. How do we make a chain of these two abstract actions? We equate the final predicate of a with the initial predicate of b and say at what time. In Example 13 we did the following:
For the time let Equation (x, y) be: y = x ? s This chaining resulted in a new action, which we called a 0 :
1. Starting time is x 2.
Note that we could have chosen a different equation for the combination of a and b, we could have chosen y = x ? s -1. In this case we would have got a new action, say a 00 with stretch s ? r -1. In practice, when combining actions such as a and b, one does not write any equation between x and y. When x and y are realised in a real time model, they get specific time values, and the equation is determined automatically. Example 18 below is such an example.
The exact formal definitions of action combination is worked out in Sect. 6.
Remark 17 Note that we are dealing here with a single condition Q a for the action a. In other words the conditional is of the form:
• P a now at time t, on the condition that Q a later at time t ? s.
For example
• The pen is yours immediately now at time t, on the condition that you buy shares at t ? s.
We have only one atomic condition and no more. So we are not addressing multiple conditions of the form:
• P a now at time t, on the condition that for i ¼ 1; . . .; k we have Q(i, a) holds later at time t ? s i .
For example we are not dealing with:
• The pen is yours immediately now at time t, on the condition that you buy shares at t ? s and put your computer on Ebay at t ? r.
There is no technical difficulty in addressing multiple conditions, it is just that such examples do not appear in the Talmud in this form.
The Talmud can have conditions of the form:
• The pen is yours immediately now at time t, on the condition that you DO NOT sell your shares BEFORE time t ? s.
This has the formal form:
• :P a now at time t, on the condition that Q a holds at a time r such that t \ r \ t ? s or equivalently
• P a now at time t, on the condition that Q a holds at all times r such that t \ r \ t ? s.
We may have some difficulties with chaining such conditions. Obviously we have no problems chaining if maintaining that Q a holds at all times r such that t \ r \ t ? s is enabled by some condition b executed after time s. However what if for each r, t \ r \ s we need to promise a separate condition b(r) to ensure that Q a holds at r? This would fall under item (2) of Definition 23 below.
Example 18 (Cross chain dependency). We start with the chain action of Fig. 6 . This is the chain action discussed already in Example 13 and Remark 16. We now want to chain into it a new action c.
The laptop is yours at t -1 provided the pen is yours at t þ s þ r 2 (of Fig. 6 ). We have two actions here to be synchronised. See Fig. 8 . We start counting s 1 = 0 at t -1. We get to time t þ s þ r 2 with
and ask '' Is the pen yours?''. Well, at this time there is the s 2 counting of the pen. s 2 counting at t þ s þ r 2 is at s 2 ¼ s þ r 2 . We have to wait another r 2 for s 2 to get to s ? r and s 1 to get to 1 ? s ? r. The real time is now t ? s ? r. Then s 2 has to go back to t to complete the pen deal and advance back to time t ? s, double back to t and then proceed to t ? s ? r. This takes s 2 = 3s ? 2r minutes.
Note that s 1 does not change, it does not care what s 2 does. So s 1 is equal (1 ? s ? r). When s 2 reaches time t ? s ? r it ''informs'' s 1 that the pen deal is done. Now s 1 jumps back to t -1 to complete his deal. The jumping is from real time point t ? s ? r. s 1 advances another simulated time from t À 1t þ s þ r 2 where the deal is supposed to be done and then jump back to t to clinch the deal and then proceed straight to t ? s ? r because the real time t ? s ? r is where s 1 is. He can now confirm the deal is done. This brings us to
Note that s 2 = 3s ? 2r as calculated in Example 13.
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From t ? s ? r real time s 1 and s 2 continue to tick.
Example 19 (Contrary to duties in the Talmud). These have been analysed in Abraham et al. (2010 Abraham et al. ( , 2011b . Some of them are temporal, what we called Type CTD III.
You should not steal, and if you did steal, you have an obligation to return or pay for the stolen object. If you do return the stolen object, the violation is cancelled retrospectively. This is why the Talmud does not recommend immediate punishment for stealing because the action might be cancelled retrospectively in the future by returning the object.
We make two relevant comments here.
1. In the case of stealing, Rabbi Shkop agrees with the Fisher model. So his Shkop model applies only to conditional actions and not to Contrary to Duties. 2. Since the stealing can be cancelled retrospectively in the future, one might adopt the view of habitually stealing objects and then cancelling the action by returning the objects stolen, and so he has no sin, but lots of ''temporarily stolen'' objects, which he returns again and again. This is reminiscent of the case where a person has no income and no tax to pay, because he only borrows the money at the beginning of a tax year to return it at the end of the tax year, only to immediately borrow it again at the beginning of the next tax year.
There is an extensive discussion in the Talmud of how to deal with such cases.
Talmudic temporal logic
We begin with the definition of Talmudic action system. In order to present it properly, let us start with existing simple action systems of artificial intelligence. In ordinary artificial intelligence an action for a certain language L has the form a = (a a , b a ) , where a a is the precondition of the action and b a is the post condition of the action, a a and b a are in the language L.
We can be more specific about this form. Let t be a moment of time (in which the action takes place) and let x 1 ; . . .; x n be the individuals involved in the action. We can write aðx 1 ; . . .; x n Þ; bðx 1 ; . . .; x n Þ as the preconditions and post condition of the action and write aðx 1 ; . . .; x n Þ to indicate that the action a involves the individuals x 1 ; . . .; x n .
We can now write Exec (t, a) to indicate that the action a was executed at time t.
In ordinary AI there are no backward causal actions and so all we have is the above. We can specialise it a bit, like asking that b a be an atomic predicate.
Note that the preconditions and post-conditions are not time dependent.
Definition 20 (Classical action temporal logic)
1. The language of classical action temporal logic has the following components:
1.1 Variables and constants for time points t 1 ; t 2 ; . . .; t 1 ; t 2 ; . . .
1.2
Variables and constants for domain elements, x 1 ; x 2 ; . . .; d 1 ; d 2 ; . . ..
1.3
The classical connectives and quantifiers for two sorted logic. 1.4
A set of n-place action names with domain variables or constants of the form aðx 1 ; . . .; x n Þ 1.5
A unary existence predicate E(x), x domain variable. 1.6
An execution predicate of the form Exec ðt; aðx 1 ; . . .; x n ÞÞ.
1.7
The earlier-later predicate t \ s for time variables. 1.8 n-place atomic time ? domain predicates Pðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ with t time variable and x i domain variables. 1.9
We define traditionally the usual notion of a time domain formula uðt 1 ; . . .; t k ; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ using the atomic predicates in 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8 and the connectives and quantifiers in 1.3. 1.10 We associate with each action aðx 1 ; . . .; x n Þ two formulas a a ðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ and b a ðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ as defined in 1.9. We assume b a ðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ is atomic as defined in 1.8. The variables in a a and b a are as indicated. We call a a the precondition for Exec ðt; aðx 1 ; . . .; x n ÞÞ and b a the post-condition. Note that a a , b a and Exec have the same variables ðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ. h is an assignment giving to each n-place predicate P a subset hðPÞ T Â D n . For each n-place action aðx 1 ; . . .; x n Þ and each d 1 ; . . .; d n 2 D and each t 2 T we have hðExecðt; aðd 1 ; . . .; d n ÞÞ 2 f0; 1g. The truth value of a wff uðx 1 ; . . .; x n Þ is defined by induction in the traditional manner. m Pðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ iff ðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ 2 hðPÞ m Execðt; aðx 1 ; . . .; x n ÞÞ iff hðExecðt; aðx 1 ; . . .; x n ÞÞÞ ¼ 1 m the connectives and quantifiers in the traditional manner We require some integrity constraints to hold, for example
• m Execðt; aðx 1 ; . . .; x n ÞÞ ) a a ðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ^b a ðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ • m b a ðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n Þ iff 9s t½mExecðs; aðt; x 1 ; . . .; x n ÞÞ and for all u, s B u B t and all b 2 A such that b b ¼ :b a we have m 6 Execðu; bðx 1 ; . . .; x n ÞÞ • Note that the pre-conditions of actions do not change with time. So, for example, if a foreign language is required for a PhD it is always a requirement.
Example 21 (Conditional actions). Now that we have a more exact formalism for actions, let us reconsider the examples of Sect. 3 Consider Example 11. We have to specify more precisely the pre-conditions and post-conditions of each action.
1. Action x gives laptop ownership to y. Preconditions:
• x owns the laptop • y is allowed to own the laptop • a document is written transferring ownership • x and y exist and sign document
Postconditions
• x does not own the laptop • y owns the laptop • document exists 2. Action y hacks into x's laptop undetected. Preconditions:
• laptop exists • y exists Postconditions:
• y logged onto laptop • no alarms triggered.
In the Shkop model of the conditional of Example 11, we said that at time 18.30 both agents m and g go back in time to 18.00 and conclude the deal. The question is which of the pre-conditions of the action of ''give laptop ownership'' we require to hold at 18.30?
Obviously m and g need to exist at 18.30. 9 Do we also require that the document exists? What if at 18.15 the document was destroyed? Well, this depends on the legal system. In the Talmud, for example, to have an effective divorce agreement, the document must exist! Another question is do we need the original document, or can a new one be drawn at 18.15 if the original one was destroyed? Obviously we need to specify, when we make a conditional of the form Action a at t if Action b at t ? s which pre-conditions of Action a should hold at t ? s before we ''jump'' back (in the Shkop model).
For this reason we present the pre-conditions of any action a as a pair of formulas
Both have to hold in order for the action to be executed. However, c a is the one that passes on to the future if we make a conditional on some future b. So for example in the laptop case, a a = document signed and exists, x owns the laptop and y allowed to own laptop and c a = x and y exist.
Remark 22
1. It stands to reason to say that all pre-conditions of actions a are always pure and unconditional. Otherwise we put them as conditionals for a itself. So to make it clear, if the ownership of the laptop by m is itself conditional on c, then m can give the laptop to g only if he makes the action conditional on the condition c as well as any other conditions he may wish to add. 2. We have seen in Example 11 that preconditions of actions can be ignored and the results of the illegal action can be used for backwards causality. Also not all the postconditions of the action need to be recorded but only those relevant to the backwards causality. Therefore the facts of interest to our models are 3. We can also assume that the ''condition'' is a state caused by some action. It could be a state of ''being married to c'' caused by the action of conducting the marriage ceremony, in which case if the woman is already married to a with a different from c, and so the action has no consequence. It could also be the state of ''having executed a marriage ceremony with c'' in which case the state is achieved by the action, even if the woman is already married to a. 
General inductive clause
The general definition is as follows: Let a and b be any conditional action already defined, then: a at t if b at all u such that t \ u B s and uðt; s; uÞ is also an action where t \ s
Comparison with the literature
In this section we discuss in what way our contribution is innovative, and compare our work with the key paper (Governatori 2010) of Governatori and Rotolo. Let us imagine a reader who says the following: ''I have not found in the paper anything really new. The idea of having more than one temporal dimension was technically explored in the AI and Law community since 2005 by Governtori, Rotolo and others. Section 4 presents a two-sorted language interpreted in discretelinear-time semantic structures. Actions are standardly described using preconditions and postconditions. The operator Exec looks somehow new, but its semantic interpretation is trivial: Exec statements are true when 1 is assigned to them. Its substantial semantics characterization are given by the constraints: the first relates, as expected, Exec with pre-and post-conditions, the second reframes the well-known law of inertia (introduced for example in Kowalski and Sergot's Event Calculus); since states the idea that b holds at any time t if no terminating actions occurred (but we could also have states-of-affairs blocking the persistence) before it. What's really innovative and new in this picture? One could think of the logic as something close to a temporalisation of FOL plus action symbols''.
These are harsh words but very far from the truth as we shall now discuss. We start with the story of Example 6 as discussed at the beginning of Sect. 3 and modify it a bit.
We start at time t = 0 when John gives a divorce to his wife Mary on the condition that she has sex with Terry at time 1. Suppose further that at time 2 Mary gets a teaching job at Church school, on the condition that she is a virtuous woman in her private life.
Let us analyse this example and see whether traditional temporal logic can handle it. We have already discussed the case of time 0 and time 1 of this example from both the Fisher and Shkop points of view at the beginning of Sect. 3 The following are the results 1. The Fisher model requires paralled histories. We can have up to 4 parallel histories corresponding to two conditions. In our case we have only 2, as in Fig. 9 . We have seen that according to Fisher, Mary does not commit adultery even in the case when she has sex with Terry. Therefore according to Fisher, Mary always gets the job. 2. According to Shkop, we get two histories as well, shown in Fig. 10 .
Here we also get different histories, but they are calculated differently.
The calculation of the truth value of the various predicates is the key difference between Fisher and Shkop. If the time line has n conditions, according to Fisher there are 2 n parallel histories and as we move along the time line we eliminate more and more of them, until we emerge with one.
There is no possibility of loops, it is a straightforward process of elimination, as more and more information comes in as time progresses.
According to Shkop the calculation is different. We also have in this case 2 n possibilities, two for each condition, but the calculation of the truth values of the predicates involves a complex algorithm of simulated time (one simulated time for each condition) and the algorithm may loop, as we see in Example 7 (divorce variations) item 3. The loop arises because of the backward causality which is To appreciate the conceptual significance of the involvement of these algorithms, consider traditional temporal logic and the way it is presented. We start with a set Q of atoms, some temporal connectives with their truth tables and a flow of time (T, \). Let us take say a one dimensional connective h, meaning ''always in the future'', and write for satisfaction and say: t hu iff 8sðt\s ! s uÞ:
To give a model, we need to give an assignment h, giving truth values to each atom q 2 Q, at each moment of time t.
So we write hðt; qÞ 2 f0; 1g. h is arbitrary. Now suppose we want to be awkward and so instead of giving you h, we say to you, for each q 2 Q, let f q be a function f q : T7 !f0; 1g. We say to you there is an infinite set of equations E on the functions f q ; q 2 Q. Solve it and you get your assignment h. This will seem to you just an exercise in mathematics. From the logical point of view all we need is the assignment h. Using h we have a model and we can go on with our logic evaluation. The equations E which we use to calculate h, are not part of the logic.
Well, Fisher and Shkop say, no, this is not the case. E is the logic. Fisher and Shkop do not use connectives. The main thrust of their models is their algorithm. The conditions ''u now if w in future'' is not a counterfactual logical connective but a condition (equation) for calculating the assignment h of the semantic model. This is why when we view the model we need to use the executable view as discussed in Sect. 2.1 This view is best for calculating h.
Fisher and Shkop say that temporal modelling is done by the choice of algorithms for calculating h and not necessarily by choice of connectives as traditionally is the case. Let us get some support for this view from the logical analysis of the language. Consider the sentence ''John is tall''. We can write it in predicate logic as u ¼ Tall (John). Is u true? Predicate logic gives truth values to atomic wffs by assignment. However, in real life, the truth value of Tall(John) is calculated. The thrust of the models for u is how we calculate! So our innovative system and idea is that we say the algorithm for computing the assignments is part of temporal logic and that certain algorithms can model backward causality in time. We believe this is quite innovative.
Let us now compare our model with that of Governatori and Rotolo. We saw above that our message is that we model temporal phenomena also by the algorithms governing the assignment h and that our temporal logic offers certain algorithms.
Implicit in our approach is that it is semantical. One can take a proof theoretical approach. Instead of giving an assignment h to each atom q at time t, we give a logical theory D t and define hðt; qÞ ¼ 1 iff D t ' q or to use traditional satisfaction notation:
Governatori and Rotolo use a proof theoretical approach and introduce two dimensions (and more) to model norm change. They have to do that since norms and norm change and legislation, etc., are proof theoretical. Their modelling task is not easy, as we may have repeated norm changes of different sorts and different temporal validity. They use defeasible temporal logic and many dimensions (in fact every trick in the trade) to present in Governatori (2010) a quite sophisticated system.
The proof theoretical approach is not new. Gabbay used it in Gabba (2001) in his time action model. However, Governatori and Rotolo make quite clever and justified logical moves in their drive to model legal norm change.
Their system can simulate the Fisher approach without difficulty, this is because the Fisher approach does not allow for loops. So we have several possible histories (which can be presented proof theoretically as (Governatori 2010) would like them) and as time progresses, all but one history are eliminated. This can be handled like norm change.
We don't think, however, that one can simulate proof theoretically the Shkop approach. The history H3 of Fig. 10 would be a problem. There is no way one can say proof theoretically at the same time that We need the Shkop algorithm with the simulated time s to get this conclusion. Such algorithms can have loops as we have seen, and so even if we (following Governatori and Rotolo) proof theoretically use an additional meta-modal logic to talk about fixed point solutions of such loops, we get more and more complicated systems which are less and less intuitive.
This ends our comparison with (Governatori 2010) . By the way, Shkop does offer a way of resolving loops and so his approach covers all potential problems. He puts forward the following Shkop principle:
• If at time t, taking action a causes a loop (because of backwards causality) which makes action a invalid, then it is forbidden to take action a.
Consider the loop of item 3 of Example 7. John divorces his wife Mary at time t = 0, on the condition that she does not marry Terry. Now since she is divorced, she asks ''Can I take the action at time t = 1 and marry Terry''? The precondition for this action is that she is free and indeed the precondition holds. So let us simulate and apply the Shkop principle. If she marries Terry, her divorce at time t = 0 is not valid, hence at time t = 1, the precondition for taking the action of marrying Terry becomes invalid, so she cannot take the action. The Shkop principle says that she cannot take the action. See our paper (Abraham et al. 2012 ) about the Shkop principle.
The above considerations can be considered as further support for our innovative models. It can be generalised and expanded in new directions.
We do have loops in international law, where a person falls under several jurisdictions. It may be that each jurisdiction sends the case to the other. The Shkop principle can be used there. It is quite intuitive and reasonable.
Conclusion
We introduced in this paper the Talmudic Temporal Logic, capable of modelling the Talmudic examples. The logic was motivated and introduced semantically. It is a new innovative system as explained in Sect. 5, and compared with the major work of Governatori and Rotolo (2010) . We are not going to develop its formal properties, proof theory, completeness, its relation to other logics, etc., etc. This is the subject for another, pure logic paper and is not essential for applying logic to modelling legal reasoning.
Note however that our model does ''export'' to general logic new ideas about temporal causality.
Some of our examples in this paper dealt with entities defined using the future. These are studied extensively in Abraham et al., where we show that the Talmud exports to general logic a new type of public announcement logic with quantum superposition semantics.
